Tashkent: Central Asia’s largest wind power project, with a capacity of one gigawatt, came online earlier this year. Built by the state-owned China Energy Engineering Group (CEEC), financed with European debt, and packaged by Saudi developer ACWA Power, the Bash-Dzhankeldy project represents a new model for international cooperation under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This development, however, raises questions for Brussels about who receives credit when the European Union foots the bill.

According to Global Voices, CEEC has explicitly framed this project as a BRI flagship that integrates Saudi Vision 2030 with China’s infrastructure-building ambitions, promoting the wind farms through a state-media livestream. The Bash-Dzhankeldy project is supported by two syndicated loans arranged by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), each comprising a USD 150 million loan on the EBRD’s own account, plus B-loans syndicated to other lenders, including French and German state funds.

While EU institutions hold a 54 percent stake in the EBRD and treat it as a Team Europe actor, it operates independently, with shareholders like China holding a 0.09 percent stake. This independence underscores the limits of Brussels’ influence, as EU-funded projects can be delivered by Chinese firms. The EBRD is working on reforming public procurement, with a review of its policies scheduled for 2025, yet private sector clients retain freedom in selecting suppliers or contractors.

Chinese firms have increasingly collaborated with multilateral development banks, shifting from the early BRI model of financing through loans from Chinese policy banks. This transition aligns with the preferences of host countries, which favor investments over debt. The Bash-Dzhankeldy project exemplifies this shift, with Chinese equity participation and international collaboration.

In Uzbekistan, Chinese state financial interests remain prominent. The Silk Road Fund, the BRI’s equity vehicle, owns 49 percent of ACWA Power’s RenewCo platform, providing exposure to Saudi solar and wind assets. As of July 2024, China Southern Power Grid holds a 35 percent stake in the Bash-Dhankedly project. Saudi Arabia and China are deepening their cooperation in clean energy, with third-party market cooperation in Central Asia and Africa showing considerable growth potential.

Uzbekistan’s renewable energy projects are dominated by Gulf firms like ACWA Power and the UAE’s Masdar. Of 26 power-purchase agreements signed since 2019, 19 were awarded to these two firms, while Chinese developers secured three, and French firms won three. Chinese contractors have dominated the engineering, procurement, and construction contracts, often financed by European public funds.

Despite the strategic cooperation between China, Saudi Arabia, and Europe, the EU faces challenges in leveling the playing field for European finance outside the EU. The strategic importance of public procurement is being recognized, but gaps and loopholes persist. The collaboration between Chinese engineering and European finance benefits host countries but complicates the EU’s competitive narrative.

This dynamic is evident in other regions, such as Africa, where similar projects illustrate the complexity of China’s BRI. Multilateral cooperation allows China to mitigate risks and maintain its presence in global markets. For Brussels, the benefits of such cooperation remain ambiguous, contrasting with its Global Gateway narrative of competition.